Alternative Democratic models in Africa
Mwalimu George Ngwane

Introduction

            If Democracy is defined as a system of Government by which the government itself is constantly subject to re-ratification by the electorate, then democracy cannot rest on a single model in Africa. The trouble with Africa is not whether it should continue to use elections as yardstick to evaluate attempts to break away from the authorization forms of power in African countries (Bakery, 1998) but whether Africa should continue to rely on multipartyism as the panacea to economic development and political stability.  The issue of democracy is complex and subtle. No definition of democracy exists in law, nor is there a global consensus over the political meaning of the concept. What does exist is an understanding that democracy is a universal value, one, which open to different legitimate interpretations deriving from various historical, cultural and regional experience of the various people around the world. In short, a modern democratic system is one which the people are able to hold heir representatives accountable for the people are able to hold their representatives accountable for the policies they pursue or the decision they make in the public sphere (Bangura, 1998). Should this system be achieved by elite competition or by mass mobilization?

            The first part of my paper discusses why from 1994, elections on a general scale have not led to stability in Africa. The second part provides an overview of how Africa should expand its democratic space through indigenous democratic models, and the third (Conclusion) focuses on the Nurturing or Consolidation of Democracy in Africa.

Electoral Choices (why these electoral futilities?)

            The first reason for electoral failures since 1994 is that African leaders bowed to multiparty democracy out of convenience rather than conviction; there was concession without conversion. Tied to this is the overemphasis of election at the tertiary level (Presidential elections). The International Community does not hype other elections (local Government) like it does with the Presidential. The impression therefore is that of a two-horse race (Ruling party and Opposition parties) where the Ruling party clings to power at all cost while the Opposition fights for power by all means. The struggle to control the centre has taken precedence over democracy per se.

            In a bid to stay in power, constitutional tinkering and electoral adjustments are being done in favour of the ruling parties and to elongate tenure of office of the incumbents.

            Another reason is the cost of running elections to the detriment of National Development. Since 1990, African countries have spent over one billion U.S dollars on the formation and servicing of multiparty system of governance (Chipenda, 1996). Without a visible pattern of development after elections, voters seem to be suffering from electoral fatigue.

            To be properly democratic, elections must be conducted in accordance   with certain organizational precepts. Most importantly, there should be a fair and objective institution with non-partisan state manly persons of integrity for administering the process from voter registration, up to the declaration of the result. Unfortunately, in most cases, the incumbent party sets up a body that is neither neutral nor independent.

            Lastly, the masses themselves have hardly mobilized behind a candidate whose ideological manifesto (where it does exist) suits them. Instead, it was the ethnic extraction or sinecure promises of the candidates that mattered. Africans failed to realize that if the wind of Independence in the 60s blew for the transfer of power from colonial rule to African rule, then the wind of democracy in the 90s blew for the transfer of power from the coterie of bureaucratic elite to the mass of industrious peasants. But were the masses adequately prepared for multiparty democratic elections based on party ideology?

 Indigenous Democratic models.

            Here, the focus is on homegrown electoral/democratic systems that take into account value system (historical, religious, political nature), social stability, economic development, electoral strength and civic culture. Another area of emphasis is on Primary (Local government) and Secondary (Parliament) levels of elections i.e. the bottom-up approach. These models seem to favour mass mobilization against elite competition, decentralization and equity against centralization and clientelism. Among others, I will like to discuss four of these models

Umbrella democracy

            This entails the conceptualization of two programmes based on different ideologies of the country. These ideologies now find expression in two structures:- party platform and/or list system. If it is within a party platform, the parties are named and the masses are obliged to identify themselves with any of them. This experiment was tried in Tanganyika in 1964 when Julius Nyerere found there was little or no opposition for his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Parliament. A commission was appointed to investigate how best to achieve the democratic principles of choice under the umbrella of a single party. The commission affirmed the principle of a single party but linked it every five years to an electoral competition among members of the same party, with the people choosing from different candidates at election time.

            About the same period (1969) in Cameroon, the one party trend became obsolete with two principal currents of thought in the party i.e Hard-line and Liberal wings. The Liberal wings wanted progressive reforms like the nomination of candidates for the various elections, (including Presidential) by the party Congress instead of by the political bureau, and the introduction of a two-list system (Joseph, 1978).

            Tanganyika and Cameroon were therefore technically not one party states but countries with two single-party system, divided by list platform and parallel to each other.

            In 1992, General Ibraham Babanginda of Nigeria created a transition programme with political parties prescribed by the Government: Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC). The Government supplied the manifestoes and financing. Unfortunately lots of power scheming and external forces hijacked this experiment and the victor (Moshood Abiola) of what Nigerians still consider the fairest and freest elections ever held in that country was incarcerated, and he later died.

No party democracy

            This involves the banning or restriction of party in favour of individual initiative. Where parties exist, they function under restricted circumstances since all political exercises whether on democracy or on economy are carried out under a national political network. There are two main emphases in this network:-

i. The existence of citizens to run for elections on their individual merit rather than under their party canopies.(Independent or private candidacy)

ii. The effective devolution of decision-making process to grassroots structures. In recent times, three leaders have stood out in the practice of the no party democracy in Africa: President Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso (1983-1987), Yoweri Museveni of Uganda (1986-2006) and Muammar Gadaffi of Libya (1969-,). A no-party democracy operates on three levels:

v     The presence of a charismatic leader with a hero cult;

v     An indigenous national ideology revised periodically;

v     A decentralized participatory structure

Through the no party democracy, emphasis is shifted from truncated partisan elections to vibrant community development; from parochial power zoning to collective nation management; and from cultural imperialism to cultural integrity. The key to the progress even to survival of Africa was not to be found merely in the multiplying of the party rivalries at the centre of the executive power, however much a structure rivalry might be desirable; it would be found rather in devolving executive power to a multiplicity of locally representative bodies-it would be found in re-establishing “vital link” within the fabric of society. (Davidson,1992).

Consociational democracy

            According to Burgsdoff, the alternative to the dogmatic proclamation of a multiparty system is a different path to democracy available for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is based on what Canadian political scientists Almond and Verba call the Consociational democracy concept. This term applies to a constitutional structure, which is canton-based, as in present day Switzerland. This federalist grassroots approach seems to correspond well to societies characterized by distinct ethnic cleavages and a fragmented socio-economic structure (Burgsdoff, 1992). This model of democracy is based on the three important principles.

v     There is a restriction to party politics:-

v     A specific ethnic group enjoys maximum  autonomy with respect to its day-to-day affairs (thus the direct responsibility of the people living in one distinct region is confined  to that particular area);

v     As regards representation at the federal (national) level each ethnic group elects its own delegates or representative. Matters of nation wide concern are decided at the federal level by the community delegates who make up, so to speak, the national government.

On November 22, 1994, the Constitutional Assembly in Ehtiopia came about with a provision, which allows for 11 regions or kilils, so drawn that each of the main ethnic groups dominates. The ideal is for such a system to encourage a graduated college approach from the base to the apex of power.

            In practice, the system would work as follows: at local level all eligible adults elect their representatives (at this level every voter knows every candidate well and can therefore make valid judgment on the candidate’s suitability for public Office). Representative so elected constitute the Electoral College which elects members of the next tier government (Parliament) and these elect the highest authority in the country (Ogbonna, 1998).

Let us not forget that in the Athenian city state, where democracy was first practiced in the ancient world, the council of five hundred which constituted the steering committee of the Assembly was composed of 50 members drawn from each of the 10 tribes and that the board of magistrates comprising 10 members was also chosen on a tribal basis; Athens enjoyed peace and stability based on this system before she was conquered by the Macedonians.

            This experiment recognizes the existence of ethnicity and it is using the energy of its people by creating autonomous self-governing regions. Close to this consociational system is an electoral approach based on ROTATION or power zoning.  In Sani Abacha’s gory stint as Nigeria’s leader (1993-1999) the constitutional Conference made some innovative ideals based on certain peculiar situation that are native to Nigeria. Among them was the clause “sharing out and rotation of the major political offices in the country to six geo-political zones into which the country was partitioned”. By so doing; the fear of marginalization and domination was put to rest. Indeed although Nigeria did not formally become a federal nation until the introduction of the Lyttleton constitution of 1954, regional federalism had actually begun under the Macpherson constitution of 1951. At this time, Nigeria was a federation of three regions revolving around three dominant ethnic groups attached to three major political parties (Akionla, 1998).

Other countries with distinct tribal cleavages like Burundi and Rwanda can emulate this system, According to Ogbonna, the greatest advantage of this system is that with the possible exception of the grassroots level electorate, all the remaining electoral colleges are composed of literate voters who can use the benefit of their literacy to make a valid choice of suitable candidates. Furthermore, all manner of corruption which now characterizes the electoral process will be eliminated, or at least reduced to the barest minimum, because the system will be dealing with smaller number as one goes to the apex of this pyramid-like structure.

Monarchical democracy:

            Pre-colonial Africa was replete with kingdoms that saw their demise during colonial invasion. In spite of this, kings and chiefs still have an important role in democratization in Africa. Under the traditional system of government, two main factors generally made it unthinkable and unfeasible for the Chief or king to impose his will on his people. First, his sacred duty as the link between man and the ancestors did not permit to oppress his people and expect the blessing or cooperation of his ancestral spirits. Second, any dictatorial tendency would bring shame to his lineage (Ayittey, 1992).

            This, arguably, is what kept the ethnic harmony between Hutus and Tutsis in Burundi and Rwanda together under the rule of a Mwami (king). It was the Belgian colonial historiography in collaboration with early missionaries, and then multiparty democracy (1989, 1993) that polarized Burundian and Rwandan countries into fratricide and the consequent political carnage.

            The stability, monarchical democracy brought, collapsed under the weight of Western liberal democracy. There is nothing wrong with some African countries following the footsteps of Morocco, Swaziland, and Lesotho. All the citizens need to do during constitutional conference is to strike a balance between a ceremonial kingship and highly decentralized modern expressions of a bashingatahe (inner council), ligogo (judiciary), and lekgotla (parliament). While kingship is attained by lineage, power at the base is through consociational means.

            What stems from this sort of democratic model is the organic link between democracy and history, history as a process not history by analogy (Mamdani, 1996). Not all African countries may go back completely to their pre-colonial starting point, but there may be a case for at least a particular retreat, a case for establishing contacts with familiar landmarks of yesteryears and then re-starting the journey of modernization under indigenous impetus (Mazrui, 1986)

Conclusion: Nurturing and Consolidating Democracy in Africa.

Once each country is able to establish a model of and public policy for Democracy, election malpractices may be minimized, political stability assured, and development guaranteed. For this to be attained, the following points should be taken into consideration:

v     There is no particular or single model of democracy and so countries should be allowed to try homegrown ideologies not parachutist models. Unfortunately, some of these ideologies have been too short-lived to be scrupulously evaluated.

v     Western Governments, multinational co operations and Breton Woods Institutions must exercise patience with African countries involved in innovative and alternative models of democracy different from the neo-liberal concept.

v     The African political leadership should understand that their citizens see democracy and election as a means to an end. Indeed the only democratic glue that holds society together is the deliverance of public goods. Sometimes elections do not fail, it is Governments that do; and when Governments do, there is voter apathy, electoral fatigue, and democratic disenchantment.

v     Africa is in dire need of a strong civil society (Partners in democracy) which should include vibrant development media; people-oriented institutions, local bodies, youths/women organizations, intellectuals and others who even at their peril, must contribute to the creative and productive dimension of elections and democratization.

v     The African people still need, either as nations or as a continent to freely sit in an indaba, a tinkhundla, a lekgotla, under a Palaver tree, or in a Sovereign National Conference to establish a public policy for democracy.