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Suggestions
for Reform of the United Nations
Dr Frank J. Ostrowski, Ph.D.,
Representative to the United Nations for the
International Fellowship of Reconciliation
General Picture
It seems evident to most NGOs that the UN,
despite being very “relevant,” is also very
“ineffective” in regard to its most central
mandate, i.e., “to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war.” Since its
founding in 1945 there have been something over
300 armed conflicts which the UN has been unable
to prevent.
Both the General Assembly and the Security
Council pass endless “resolutions” which, having
no force of law, are simply ignored when the
parties of concern choose to ignore them.
Possibly the most egregious example of this has
been the conduct of Israel, which has ignored
some 30+ resolutions of the SC, supported, of
course, by its superpower patron, the United
States. But if it were not the US, it
would be some other patron for some other
country.
Likewise, the subsidiary organs of the United
Nations, such as the International Court of
Justice, is often ignored when a powerful
country chooses to do so. Thus, when the
ICJ condemned the United States under the Reagan
Administration for mining the harbors in
Nicaragua, President Reagan simply ignored their
injunction.
It seems to me that the problem of the UN’s
paralysis stems from three sources;
·
Sovereignty of the nations composing the
UN trumps all else.
·
The power of the major states, especially
the one remaining superpower, the US,
intimidates smaller countries into falling in
line with its wishes.
·
The continuing prestige and power (out of
proportion to modern day realities) contained in
the veto power conferred on the five major
victors of WWII (France, Great Britain, Russia,
China and the US) makes progress not just slow,
but often impossible, especially if any of them
disagree.
Although the UN
is quite able to engage in many other very
wonderful projects throughout the world, and has
acted as the focal point for a multitude of
agencies devoted to international cooperation,
it has not been able to achieve what would have
to be regarded as its much higher potentials,
including not just the elimination of war, but
disarmament, observation of treaties and
judicial establishments, good progress on the
Millennium Development Goals, and prevention of
human rights abuses.
In other words, despite being a highly
relevant
organization, the UN has been ineffective.
What we propose is that Civil Society would
speak to the 192 nations of the UN with
something like a single voice, and ask, no,
demand
of it that its reform, undertaken in response to
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s, be something far
more than what either he or any country has yet
envisioned.
What we propose is that the UN become a truly
world government which can enact laws (not
just pass resolutions), can intervene
across borders for the protection of human
rights (not just suggest a course of
action), and can levy taxes for its operation
(not just depend on voluntary
contributions).
I am quite well aware of what reactions the term
“world government” causes in very many of my
readers, even those who want to see changes
occur. However, whenever an organization,
whether it be a local city or the United
Nations, can enact laws and collect taxes to
support its operations, it is no longer a “talk
forum,” but a genuine political entity which is
capable of achieving its goals by means of
powerful interventions.
One caution in this, however: what must be
preserved at all costs is the absolute
dedication to nonviolent means in the solution
of conflict. Chapter VI and VII of the
current UN Charter allow for coercion, first
(Chapter VI) by sanctions, and secondly (Chapter
VII) by military means. But the basic
direction of the UN Charter is not to use
military means, but to work in a multilateral
context to solve differences which arise between
nations.
Further, we are proposing a United Nations which
is more equitably representational in its
two main bodies, and is not constrained by
either the veto or the financial control of any
single country or group of countries, nor by
multinational corporations.
As a small first step, we would like you,
the NGOs of the world whom we were able to
reach, to consider the proposals outlined below
as possible ways in which the United Nations
could be reformed to achieve the above goals.
These proposals are in no way meant to be
absolute or final, but are meant to be the start
of a dialogue first with members of Civil
Society on the reform they would like to see so
as to make the UN truly effective, and secondly,
once these proposals have been reworked to the
satisfaction of at least a two-thirds majority
of the NGOs who wish to lend support to this
project, to presenting the proposals with a
great deal of weight to the member states of the
United Nations.
It should be noted at the outset that this is
not just a very ambitious proposal, but one for
which the national governments which comprise
the United Nations will probably not have much
interest, and might be expected to oppose
actively. Further, the UN was established
not only as a governmental (not
“nongovernmental”) body, but also with built-in
structures which have made it virtually
impossible to reform it in a fundamental way.
Thus, for example, to do away with the veto
power, the UN Charter must be amended. But
to amend it requires a two-thirds vote of the
member states, including the five permanent,
veto-holding member states. It takes
no intelligence to see that these five states
would be very slow to relinquish their power in
the world body. Although attempts have
been made to do away with the veto power for
almost as long as the UN has existed, this
voting requirement has been a constant
stumbling-block.
Likewise, nation-states jealously guard the
inviolability of their borders, and any attempt
to say that an outside body, even the United
Nations, can come into their country to correct
a situation is most strenuously resisted.
It is with all of this in mind that I am
proposing that we, members of civil society in
the nongovernmental organizations and in the
other bodies which do not represent governments,
approach the 192 members of the United Nations
and attempt to speak with a unified voice about
the fundamental changes which we want.
Often we are mentioned as the “other”
superpower, i.e., the court of public opinion
contained in the wisdom of civil society.
This appellation, while poetically wonderful,
needs to display itself in such a way that real
change can happen.
It is my belief that it is time that we spoke to
the powers of the world and let them know that
because the organization of the United Nations,
although profoundly relevant, has not fulfilled
its promise, it needs radical change, even much
greater change than has been envisioned in Kofi
Annan’s In Larger Freedom (which set out
the reforms he saw as necessary) if it is to
become truly effective and able to keep the
world from war.
Attempts to reform the UN, including abolishing
the veto in the Security Council, have been
undertaken almost since its inception, always
without real movement or success.
Therefore, we must recognize that it will take a
mammoth force to achieve the task we are
proposing.
It is my hope that the unified voice of civil
society will move the United Nations Member
States to action and reform that they have not
been able to achieve from any internal pressure.
Please read through the suggestions below as a
first step to formulate what kind of UN we want.
I welcome your feedback. The ideas I
present below are not set in concrete, but are,
I hope, sufficiently thought out to form the
basis of a good dialogue before we would be bold
enough to present them to the UN Member States.
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Suggestions for Reform of the
United Nations
This paper presents five main suggestions for
reform of the United Nations:
·
Reform of the Security Council
·
Reform of the General Assembly
·
Taxation to support the work of the UN
·
The status of the Secretary-General
·
The guiding principles for the UN
A. The
Security Council
This is a proposal for making
the Security Council of the United Nations
·
Representative and
·
Effective
Overview of Reform of the
Security Council
-
First, we would, for the purpose of this
proposal, divide the world into seven
regions (each region includes all nearby
island states)
·
Europe (including Iceland and the newly
added members from the former Soviet bloc)
·
Africa
·
North and Central Asia and the Middle
East up to the border of Egypt
·
South and Southeast Asia plus Australia
·
East Asia and the Western Pacific island
states
·
North America and the Caribbean
·
South America below Panama
-
Increase the Security
Council to 28 members, four from each of
the seven regions mentioned under
paragraph 1.
-
Consider membership on
the Security Council for these Member
States by population only.
-
Create four tiers of
membership by population:
·
Largest (L1)
o
For Europe: Germany
o
For Africa: Nigeria
o
For North and Central Asia and the Middle
East up to the border of Egypt: Russia
o
For South and Southeast Asia: India
o
For East Asia and the Western Pacific
Islands: China
o
For North America and the Caribbean: the
United States
o
For South America below the Panama Canal:
Brazil
·
Second Largest (L2)
o
For Europe: France (with the UK a very
close second)—see below)
o
For Africa: Egypt
o
For North Asia and the Middle East up to
the border of Egypt: Pakistan
o
For South and Southeast Asia: Bangladesh
o
For East Asia and the Western Pacific
Islands: Indonesia
o
For North America: Mexico
o
For South America: Colombia
·
Of the rest, one member would come from
each of two groups:
o
Upper tier: top half of countries
remaining in a region after L1 and L2—the Medium
(M) states
o
Lower tier: lower half of countries in a
region remaining after L1 and L2—Smallest (S)
states
-
Tiers will be determined by the most
recent existing worldwide census.
L1 and L2 will obtain their
membership automatically. The
states from a tier representing M and S
will be elected by the peer states in
their region in those tiers (with one
exception noted below in paragraph 7)
-
L1 and L2 will serve for 5 years.
At the beginning of their third year,
population size of all countries will be
assessed. If L1 and L2
are still the two largest, they will
automatically retain their seat for the
next 5 years. If not, the two
largest states will get the next 5 year
slots. If a states in the M
and/or S
tier has become larger than either L1
or L2, that state will move into the
position of holding the next 5 year
position on the Security Council.
-
M and S will each serve
for three years and will be elected by
their peer States in their region.
The sole exception to this will be that
the UK will automatically be given a
seat as an “M” member and for
five years, rather than three. The
reason for this is that, if the present
five permanent members of the Security
Council are to be induced to accede to
this proposal, it may be necessary to
give special consideration to states
which will consider themselves
negatively impacted. (It is to be
noted that Russia, China and the United
States by simple reason of population
will retain an initial five-year
membership, as will France).
However for all six other regions, at
the beginning of the second year an
election will be held among their peer
states in their respective region for
who will be the upcoming representative
for the coming three years. After
the initial five-year period has passed,
there will cease to be any special
privileging of any state regarding
membership in the Security Council.
-
For a binding resolution to pass, a
three-quarter vote of the membership
will be necessary, i.e., 21 members,
subject to paragraph 10.
-
The veto of individual states will be
abolished.
-
However, a veto may be exercised by any
four of the seven states in a tier
agreeing to vote “no” on a particular
resolution. The purpose of this is
to protect the larger states from what
they might consider to be nuisance
resolutions by smaller ones, and to
protect smaller states from what they
might consider to be unfair resolutions
by more powerful states. At no
time, however, can a single state veto
any resolution duly passed by a
three-quarter majority and not vetoed in
the manner prescribed in this paragraph.
-
By being a member of this newly
constituted United Nations, all states,
whether on the Security Council or not,
will be legally bound by
decisions and resolutions of the
Security Council.
Rationale for this proposal
The democratization of the UN
should take into account
·
The will of the people, i.e., countries
with large populations
·
General regional considerations
·
Protection of the vulnerable, i.e., the
smaller countries
It should not give priority to
·
Military power
·
Contribution to the UN budget
·
Economic power
·
Religious or ethnic ideologies
·
Artificial and ad hoc voting blocs
The above plan could have some
possibility of success, even given the aversion
of the current permanent members of the Security
Council (P5) to give up power, notably the veto,
because:
·
It retains a veto power, but not for the
powerful states alone, nor for an individual
country. Rather
o
The veto is for both the large and small
countries.
o
It needs cooperation among countries of
similar-sized populations to muster a veto.
·
Three of the P5 would, at least
initially, remain as five year members (Russia,
China and the US), simply because the size of
their populations would provide for it.
France would also become a five-year member
initially because it is second in size in its
region.
·
Although the UK would lose its preeminent
position as a member of the P5 with veto power,
it might be induced to go along with the
proposal from getting at least an automatic
introductory five-year membership.
What is important to note is that the power of
the
L1 and L2 tiers is based on the size of
population alone. They will, in essence,
retain a certain greater degree of power, in
that their term of office will be for five years
(or more, depending on the changing nature of
states and populations)—versus only three years
for the
M and S tiers. However, simultaneously
the smallest states will have a degree of power
as well, in that they can form a coalition
against their more populous counterparts and
veto resolutions which they might feel would be
injurious to them as the more vulnerable members
of human society. Moreover, the fact
that three-quarters of the Security Council
would be needed to pass a binding resolution
means that, although absolute consensus would
not be demanded, a fairly high degree of
consensual thinking would be. Of course,
there could be unanimous adoption of any
resolution, but since this is often very
unlikely, at least a three-quarter consensus
would be required.
The purpose of all this, of course, is to move
the Security Council into a position in which it
is more representative and at the same time more
effective. This will be particularly
important if, as is envisaged in the outcome
document for the World Summit of September,
2005, the UN is going to bolster its
peacekeeping force and peacebuilding operations.
If large populations are given their due as
needing to be heard more, and at the same time
small populations are given a real voice, it
seems that humanity is better served.
Likewise, it can be expected that, because a
three-quarter, rather than a simple or even
two-thirds, majority is needed for a binding
resolution, there could be much better adherence
to decisions taken.
Naturally, exactly proportional voting by
population would not be achieved by this
proposal, since two enormously populous
countries (China and India) would still have
only one vote, and even tiny states with very
small populations would have the same single
vote. Such disparity, however, is
intentional, since it will be up to members of
the Security Council to protect the small
countries from the overwhelming power of the
large ones.
Obviously, the stumbling block to reform of the
Security Council has always been the veto power
of the P5, as well as their preeminence as
permanent members. As we know, elimination
of this veto power can be effected only by a
two-thirds vote of the Member States of the UN
to change the UN Charter, including the votes
of the P5. It is highly unlikely that
the P5 would vote easily to give up their veto
or permanent status prerogative, given the
tendency of every country to cling to its
privilege, unless it can be demonstrated to them
that they will retain much of what they have
always had, but in a much more multilateral way.
Therefore, any real change, such as contemplated
by the current proposal, realistically caters to
the concerns of the P5, and allows at least the
retention of a form of veto power. The
current proposal, however, does so in a highly
altered, and much more democratic form, and one
which demands cooperation rather than fighting
between the great powers in the halls of the UN.
While the current proposal does eliminate the
veto by any individual country, it does not
totally eliminate it, but retains it with a
greatly changed mechanism.
B. The
General Assembly
For voting in the General Assembly (GA), many
proposals have been brought forward which would
achieve some kind of truly proportional voting,
as, for example, the Global Peoples Assembly, or
the Binding Triad.
As for the Global Peoples Assembly, something
which would start the creation of a new world
body from scratch, and would rely on member
states’ being democracies with representative
ruling bodies, I think that this is too much to
expect at the present time, and would entail
creating an entirely new and parallel world
body.
The Binding Triad, on the other hand would
retain the current one country-one vote format
of the GA, but give two additional weights to
every vote cast.. Every country
would have one vote, as it does today, but that
vote would be weighted by population and by
contribution to the UN budget.
I suggest that there be only one weight applied
to the “one country, one vote” system currently
used, i.e., population. I would
term this a “Binding Dyad.” This would
mean that China’s vote in the GA would have an
enormous weight because of its population, as
opposed to, let us say, Barbados. I would
suggest that the weight of contribution to the
UN budget be omitted, since I believe that this
gives undue power to money in the affairs of
global governance. Population, on the
other hand, should have influence and power by
its very nature.
However, I would suggest two additional
qualifications to the Binding Dyad as I propose
it above. One is that the representatives
to both the Security Council and the General
Assembly of the United Nations be elected by the
populations of the countries from which they
come, rather than being appointed by the king,
dictator, president, or prime minister of that
country. Secondly, I propose that, in the
case of very populous countries, not one, but
several representatives be elected, proportional
to the population they represent. These
representatives would be empowered to vote
independently of whatever might be the vote of
the chief representative. However,
generally only one representative would take
his/her seat at the SC or GA, and would record
the vote of all the secondary representatives.
Thus, for example, while Barbados might have one
vote by reason of its membership in the UN and
one vote by reason of minimum population, China
might have one vote by reason of membership in
the GA, but 120 votes by reason of 1.2 billion
people. Those 120 votes for a particular
resolution, however, might be split, with 70,
let us say, voting for a resolution, and 50
voting against it. Although there would be
only one representative present at the table in
the GA hall, all of those votes would be cast
via the internet from around China.
For a law to be passed by this reconstituted
General Assembly there would be required a
two-thirds majority of countries (one
country/one vote) tally, plus a two-thirds total
of population-weighted votes. Countries
with less than 10,000,000 inhabitants would
still receive one population-weighted vote,
while countries with 100,000,000 would receive
ten, and so on. Although this means that
very small countries would have a
disproportionately large weight of voting by
population, the impact of this imbalance would,
in my opinion, be slight, given the
significantly greater number of votes which
would be accorded to large countries.
Also, and very fundamentally, what I am
suggesting is that a United Nations General
Assembly so constituted would make laws,
not just pass resolutions, and laws which are
binding on the peoples of the world, just
because they have been passed by the peoples of
the world. This same binding power would
hold as well for the decisions of the Security
Council, as proposed above.
I am well aware that once we begin speaking of
binding laws we are speaking about a
global governance which is worldwide and is
asking every state in the world to reconsider
the limits of its sovereignty.
I would further suggest that the General
Assembly be empowered, just as it is by the
current UN Charter, to take on the matter of
peace and security if the Security Council (as
constituted above) is unable to arrive at a
conclusion to maintain peace and security by its
decisions (Uniting for Peace—Resolution 377).
C.
Funding of the UN
The third fundamental point to be addressed
is the matter of funding of the UN, including
all of its peacemaking, peacekeeping, and
peacebuilding operations, as well as the vast
number of humanitarian, development, social, and
educational programs that fall within its scope.
Up till now that funding has depended on the
voluntary (but stratified) contributions of the
Member States, sometimes delivered, sometimes
not, but always with a certain disparity of
participation.
My proposal suggests that funding of the United
Nations be by taxation on the transfer of
goods, currencies, and services in international
trade. This taxation need never be very
exorbitant, since we are dealing with a
worldwide trade that is enormous. What it
would amount to, perhaps, would be no more than
perhaps 1/10 of 1% taxation on these
transactions, although, not being an economist,
I would leave to those much more skilled at this
than I to determine. The revenues thereby
generated would easily fund all the programs
which the peoples of the world need to obtain
security, development and human rights.
Once again, I am well aware that the matter of
taxation moves the United Nations into an
entirely different sphere of operations, and
makes it a body which governs and has the task
of administering the funds it collects for the
good of the world society. Many countries
may balk immediately at any attempt to introduce
the power to levy taxes. But if we are
going to have a world body which can effectively
do its job in so many areas, it is evident to
almost all of us that voluntary contributions
have made it unable to achieve the things which
are necessary to get its work done.
D. The
Secretary-General of the UN
Just as today, I envision the Secretary-General
of the UN to have no more than moral power, as
he/she works for the peace of the world by
suggesting paths to follow and executes the laws
of the General Assembly and the binding
resolutions of the Security Council. In no
way would this person ever have dictatorial
powers. That person’s job would be, just
as it has always been, an arduous one, as he or
she attempts to calm the fires of tension which
can so easily lead to armed conflict, and report
back to both the SC and the GA about what
progress or failure to go forward there has been
on the binding resolutions or the binding laws
which those bodies have enacted.
E.
Guiding principles for the UN
The UN started with the overarching mandate
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war,” and still today that must remain its
mission. No greater tyrant over human
dignity and worth exists than war, and an
organization dedicated to the task of stopping
it must take pre-eminent rank among the
organizations of the world.
Shortly after its inception also was enacted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, something
so visionary in its scope that mankind sees its
statements as descriptors of the humanity toward
which we want to progress. Even if its
tenets are frequently derided, ignored, or
abused, it is the higher and nobler instincts in
all of us which strive to make these rights the
norm for human beings across the globe.
Likewise, human suffering from either the lack
of having these rights or from natural
disasters, war, poverty, or other causes calls
out to us for help, and for our involvement in
the search for solutions.
These three, often put generally under the
headings of security, human rights, and
development, form the basis of the work of the
United Nations.
I would like to add a fourth, essential to the
work of all the other three: reconciliation.
Without reconciliation of the parties to some
kind of harmony, all the efforts at prevention
of future violent conflict will be in vain.
Often it is very astute and sensitive NGOs who
can play a significant role in moving parties in
conflict to that end.
What is important in all of this to note is that
as a world government, the United Nations would
be unlike other governments, which have narrow
national interests at stake, and which have
histories often of millennia of conflict with
other nation-states. The United Nations
has as its purpose something precisely opposite
to that of individual nation-states: harmony
between them. The United Nations would be
able to exercise its mandate for peaceful
resolution of conflicts impartially simply
because it would be expressing the will of
mankind, not the will of one nation-state which
is seeking domination over another.
Conclusion
It is the purpose of this paper to sound out
a vast multitude of Civil Society Organizations
in an attempt to come to a consensus and speak
with one voice to the current United Nations
about how we think the Organization should be
structured in order to fulfill its primary goal,
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war.”
I invite your comments,
questions, and support.
Yours truly,
Frank J. Ostrowski, Ph.D.
Representative to the United Nations for the
International Fellowship of
Reconciliation
1214 Poplar Grove Dr. NE
Atlanta, GA 30306 USA
404-876-2216; 404-876-5909 (FAX)
frankjo2@aol.com |
